Abstract
The value-free ideal in science has been criticised as both unattainable and undesirable. We argue that it can be defended as a practical principle guiding scientific research even if the unattainability and undesirability of a value-free end-state are granted. If a goal is unattainable, then one can separate the desirability of accomplishing the goal from the desirability of pursuing it. We articulate a novel value-free ideal, which holds that scientists should act as if science should be value-free, and we argue that even if a purely value-free science is undesirable, this value-free ideal is desirable to pursue.
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Notes
It is, of course, obviously true that some of the means to a particular end can be desirable even if the end itself is not. A state of complete starvation is undesirable, but cutting out junk food from one’s diet may well be desirable, even though it is, inter alia, one of the means to the end of starvation. What we are talking about here is something stronger: not merely the desirability of taking certain actions that happen to be means to an undesirable end, but the desirability of actively pursuing the undesirable end itself.
The sharpness of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values has been challenged (Rooney, 1992). We believe this is a useful and important distinction, although the boundary may be vague. Constraints of space do not permit a defence of our claim here.
From here on, when we use the word “values” without qualification, we are referring to non-epistemic values.
In terms of the taxonomy developed in Ward (2021), we are considering values as justifying reasons for scientific choices, while remaining agnostic about whether they also function as causal effectors for those choices.
There may well be three or more value-based considerations in conflict, all leading to mutually incompatible conclusions. We focus on pair-wise contestation (bifurcation) as the smallest unit of value influence in the inferential process.
This does not mean that the second set of values must lead to the contradictory conclusion ~ C. It could, for example, be the case that they lead to a denial that either C or ~ C can be concluded, due to a lack of sufficient evidence.
The cases of Soviet genetics and mid-twentieth century primatology are staples in the literature on values in science; for a useful introduction, see Elliott (2017).
This argument is, of course, empirical, and while it may more or less hold based on contingent facts about our contemporary society, it is not obvious that it is generally true.
Miller (2014) makes a similar argument, framed in terms of the notion of pragmatic encroachment.
The infeasibility of the value-free end state has been argued for in numerous contexts, including vaccine safety (Goldenberg, 2021), enzyme classification (Conix, 2020), the science of well-being (Alexandrova, 2018), epidemiological modelling during the Covid-19 pandemic (Winsberg et al., 2020), and especially climate science (Havstad & Brown, 2017; John, 2015; Frisch, 2020; Winsberg, 2012). Hoyningen-Huene (2023) argues that the inductive risk argument does not pose a serious threat to the objectivity of science.
A similar point is made in de Melo-Martin and Intemann (2016).
See also Boulicault and Schroeder (2021) for discussion of this strategy.
This objection has been pressed by several authors. Steele (2012) notes that in complex domains deferral would require complicated reports which would mitigate their policy-relevance, Elliott (2011) argues that the deferral strategy is harmful because it involves ‘passing the buck’ to decision-makers who must formulate policy, and Steel (2016) and Brown (2019) argue that the deferral strategy renders science practically inconsequential. Frisch (2020) argues for a ‘no-buck-passing’ principle for science.
Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these examples.
It is, of course, true that one could still describe this larger scale process as constrained minimization. Trivially, any elimination strategy in the real world could also be described as constrained minimization, as there are always normative constraints restricting how we can pursue elimination. No one would suggest, for instance, that the goal of poverty elimination be fulfilled by bringing about the extinction of humanity. We do not take this to mean that we should never talk about a search strategy as aiming at elimination rather than minimization.
Ruphy (2006) defends a similar argument.
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Cristian Larroulet Philippi, Adrian Erasmus, Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Sophia Crüwell, Ina Jäntgen, Zinhle Mncube, Adrià Segarra, Oliver Holdsworth and Kit Patrick for helpful discussion.
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Menon, T., Stegenga, J. Sisyphean science: why value freedom is worth pursuing. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 13, 48 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00552-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00552-7