In this work, we propose that humor violates norms that can build consensus or escalate conflict in negotiations. Drawing on social identity theory, we propose that humor commits norm violations that are more likely to be perceived as benign among ingroup observers in negotiations, but perceived as offensive to outgroup observers in negotiations. We introduce the Comedy, Consensus, and Conflict Framework to shed light on the interpersonal effect of humor on negotiations. When humor is expressed to an ingroup observer, relative to neutral communication, humor is more likely to violate weak norms that govern social group membership resulting in the violation as being perceived as benign, which promotes cooperative behaviors in negotiations such as concessions and collaborative problem-solving. By contrast, when humor is expressed to an outgroup observer, relative to neutral communication, humor is more likely to violate strong norms that define social group membership resulting in the violation as being interpreted as offensive, which triggers competitive behaviors in negotiations such as aggressive offers and hardened positions. Furthermore, we suggest that humor not only generates appraisals of social identity threats, but also affective responses that influence negotiation behavior. Finally, we expand our theoretical model about humor to consider key relational factors that influence norm strength, which motivates whether negotiators appraise norm violations as offensive or benign.

中文翻译：

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喜剧、共识和冲突框架：喜剧作为一种违反规范的行为可能会在谈判中建立共识或升级冲突

在这项工作中，我们提出幽默违反了在谈判中建立共识或加剧冲突的规范。根据社会认同理论，我们提出幽默会违反规范，这些行为在谈判中的内群体观察者中更有可能被视为良性，但在谈判中的外群体观察者中被视为冒犯。我们引入喜剧、共识和冲突框架来阐明幽默对谈判的人际影响。当向群体内观察者表达幽默时，相对于中立的沟通，幽默更有可能违反管理社会群体成员资格的弱规范，导致这种违规行为被视为良性，从而促进谈判中的合作行为，例如让步和协作问题。解决。相比之下，当向外群体观察者表达幽默时，相对于中立的交流，幽默更有可能违反定义社会群体成员资格的严格规范，导致这种违规行为被解释为冒犯性，从而引发谈判中的竞争行为，例如激进的报价和坚定的立场。此外，我们认为幽默不仅会产生对社会身份威胁的评估，还会产生影响谈判行为的情感反应。最后，我们扩展了关于幽默的理论模型，以考虑影响规范强度的关键关系因素，这会促使谈判者将违反规范的行为评估为冒犯性还是良性的。