This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. For identification, we use a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mixed-gender elections in the US House of Representatives. The effect grows over a female representative's tenure and concentrates in female representatives who are on powerful congressional committees. Changes in the pool of and behavior by government contractors cannot explain the result. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting is not associated with economic costs.

中文翻译：

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女性领导力对从国会山收缩到大街的影响

本文提供了新的证据，表明女性政治家增加了分配给女性拥有的公司的美国政府采购合同的比例。为了进行识别，我们对美国众议院混合性别选举样本使用了断点回归设计。这种影响随着女性代表的任期而增长，并集中在强大的国会委员会中的女性代表身上。政府承包商群体和行为的变化无法解释这一结果。政府合同中的性别比例更加平衡与经济成本无关。