Content platforms suffer from declining subscriber growth. To address this issue, we examine an interesting strategy that competing platforms jointly launch a membership bundle, which provides consumers with simultaneous access to them at a reduced price. We investigate how the bundle approach interacts with first-party content production in shaping platforms’ pricing and content-sharing decisions. By solving a game-theoretical model, we illustrate that: first, competing platforms offer the bundle only when they are less differentiated. Second, in stark contrast with the consequence of keeping the content exclusive without the bundle, the platform is more likely to share its content with the membership bundle. Third, despite the exclusivity of first-party content, with the membership bundle, the rival platform may generate higher profit instead of always being harmed without the bundle. We enrich the understanding of how platform coopetition interacts with first-party content production and draw practical implications for platform owners.

内容平台的用户增长下降。为了解决这个问题，我们研究了一个有趣的策略，即竞争平台联合推出会员捆绑包，让消费者能够以较低的价格同时访问它们。我们研究了捆绑方法如何与第一方内容制作相互作用，以制定平台的定价和内容共享决策。通过求解博弈论模型，我们说明：首先，竞争平台仅在差异化较小时才提供捆绑服务。其次，与在没有捆绑的情况下保持内容独家的结果形成鲜明对比，平台更有可能通过会员捆绑来共享其内容。第三，尽管第一方内容具有排他性，但通过会员捆绑，竞争对手平台可能会产生更高的利润，而不是在没有捆绑的情况下总是受到伤害。我们丰富了对平台合作如何与第一方内容制作互动的理解，并为平台所有者带来了实际影响。