This paper argues that the proponents of epistemological scientism must take some stand on scientific methodology. The supporters of scientism cannot simply defer to the social organisation of science because the social processes themselves must meet some methodological criteria. Among such criteria is epistemic evaluability, which demands intersubjective access to reasons. We derive twelve theses outlining some implications of epistemic evaluability. Evaluability can support weak and broad variants of epistemological scientism, which state that sciences, broadly construed, are the best sources of knowledge or some other epistemic goods. Since humanities and social sciences produce epistemically evaluable results, narrow types of scientism that take only natural sciences as sources of knowledge require additional argumentation in their support. Strong scientism, which takes sciences as the only source of knowledge, also needs to appeal to some further principles since evaluability is not an all-or-nothing affair.

本文认为，认识论科学主义的支持者必须在科学方法论上采取某种立场。科学主义的支持者不能简单地服从科学的社会组织，因为社会过程本身必须满足一些方法论标准。在这些标准中有认知可评价性，它需要主体间的原因访问。我们推导出十二个论点，概述了认知可评估性的一些含义。可评估性可以支持认识论科学主义的弱而广泛的变体，它指出科学，从广义上讲，是知识或其他一些认知商品的最佳来源。由于人文和社会科学产生了认知上可评估的结果，因此仅将自然科学作为知识来源的狭隘类型的科学主义需要额外的论证来支持。