Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call ‘symmetry inferentialism’. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration.

基于对称性的推论已经渗透到物理哲学和科学形而上学的许多讨论中。据称，物理理论中的对称性将使我们能够得出关于世界的形而上学结论，我将这种观点称为“对称推论主义”。本文对这一观点至关重要。我声称（a）它对物理对称性的相关有效性域进行了哲学上有问题的表征，并且（b）它忽略了建立相关物理对称性的两种相反方式之间的区别。我的结论是，当考虑到这两点时，对称推论主义就失去了说服力。